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I. INTRODUCTION 
According to the International Labor Organization (ILO) there are 
approximately 168 million child laborers in the world. 1 Despite the 
overall decline in child labor, the ILO estimates that the decline in child 
labor has been slowing. 2 Many of these children are victims of modem 
slavery. 3 Modem slavery takes many different forms, including forced 
labor.4 In 2012, the ILO estimated that 20.9 million people were 
victims of forced labor globally. 5 Of these, twenty-six percent, or 5.5 
million, fell under the age of 18.6 
The Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), a federal statute of the United 
States, has emerged as a potentially powerful tool in the effort to 
combat child labor globally. The statute grants federal courts subject 
matter jurisdiction over claims arising from torts committed against 
non-U.S. nationals in violation of international law.7 Since the 1980s, 
human rights activists and victims of human rights violations have 
brought ATS claims in the U.S. against the perpetrators of human rights 
violations. 8 Recently, a number of such claims have been brought on 
behalf of children who argue that international law has been violated by 
virtue of their subjection to labor constituting slavery or forced labor. 
This paper argues that both the enslavement and forced labor of 
children constitute violations of customary international law, for which 
the A TS provides a civil remedy. The paper first introduces the ATS. 
It then explores how U.S. federal courts have treated slavery, forced 
labor, and child labor claims under the statute. Thereafter, it reviews 
the practice of States and the relevant sources of international law and 
argues that there is a norm of international law prohibiting slavery and 
forced labor generally, as well as the enslavement and forced labor of 
children. Lastly, it argues that the unique status of children within the 
1. ILO, !LO Says Global Number of Child Labourers Down by a Third since 2000, 
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (Sept. 23, 2013), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS _ 221568/lang-
en/index.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2014). 
2. Id. 
3. ILO, SPECIAL ACTION PROGRAMME TO COMBAT FORCED LABOR, ILO GLOBAL 
ESTIMATE OF FORCED LABOR 14 (2012), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/- ed_norm/- -
declaration/documents/publication/wcms_l82004.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). 
4. ILO, Forced Labor, available at http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-
labour/lang----en/index.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2014). 
5. PROGRAMME TO COMBAT FORCED LABOR, supra note 3, at 13. 
6. Id. at 14. 
7. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2012). 
8. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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law of nations merits a special analysis of the elements of forced labor, 
specifically because of children's status within the international 
community as persons in need of protection. Under international law, 
not only is children's ability to assert their rights different from that of 
their adult counterparts, but also children possess limited capacity to 
consent to certain types of labor, dependent largely on their age and the 
conditions of labor. 
II. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
The Alien Tort Statute provides federal courts with "original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations."9 While the First Congress passed the 
statute within the Judiciary Act of 1789, it was invoked as the basis for 
a court's jurisdiction in only one case in over 170 years. 10 This changed 
in 1980 when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided Filartiga v. 
Pefia-lrala. 11 Reversing the district court's determination that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction, the Second Circuit held that the Alien Tort 
Statute provided the district court with jurisdiction over the plaintiffs 
wrongful death claim. The Court held that the Paraguayan plaintiffs 
successfully alleged conduct that violated a norm of international law, 
namely the Paraguayan defendant's torture of their relative. 12 There, the 
Court determined that "[ a ]mong the rights universally proclaimed by all 
nations ... is the right to be free of physical torture." 13 
Following Filartiga, the Supreme Court held that while the ATS is 
a jurisdictional statute, 14 the substantive law governing A TS claims 
should be derived from the law of nations because "international law is 
a part of our [federal] law." 15 Further, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the 
Court held that federal courts possess limited discretion to recognize 
norms of international law. 16 However the Court emphasized that lower 
courts should restrain their discretion in identifying previously 
unrecognized violations of the law of nations. Nevertheless, since 
Filartiga, the A TS has become an important tool for human rights law, 
and federal courts now entertain suits by non-nationals against civil 
9. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2012). 
10. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 692 (2004). 
11. See generally Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876. 
12. Id. at 890. 
13. Id. 
14. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 694. 
15. Id. at 730 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)). 
16. Id. at 73 l. 
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rights abusers for certain violations of human rights. 17 
Significantly, in Filartiga the Court recognized the potential for 
the change and evolution of customary international law over time. 18 In 
fact, it identified human rights law as a primary example of this: "In the 
modem age, humanitarian and practical considerations have combined 
to lead the nations of the world to recognize that respect for 
fundamental human rights is in their individual and collective 
interest." 19 Federal courts have been fairly uniform in finding that the 
law of nations evolves over time. 2° Furthermore, in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, the Supreme Court endorsed this interpretation by recognizing 
claims brought for violations of the ''present-day law of nations." 1 
Last year, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, the 
Supreme Court limited the applicability of the ATS over certain 
claims. 22 After noting that "there is no indication that the A TS was 
passed to make the United States a uniquely hospitable forum for the 
enforcement of international norms," the Court held that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to A TS claims. 23 
Yet Kiobel 's effect on ATS litigation is far from clear, and the 
decision "[wa]s careful to leave open a number of significant questions 
regarding the reach and interpretation of the [ATS]."24 Clearly, Kiobel 
restricts ATS's applicability to so-called "F-cubed [ATS] actions," 
actions involving non-U.S. foreigners suing a foreign defendant based 
17. Virginia Monken Gomez, The Sosa Standard: What Does It Mean for Future ATS 
Litigation?, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 469, 470 (2006). 
18. Filartiga , 630 F.2d at 890. 
19. Id.; but see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(Bork, J. concurring). 
20. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1999); 
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889; Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal. 
1987). 
21. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 ( emphasis added). 
22. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 U.S. 1659, 1669 (2013). The 
presumption against extraterritoriality "is a longstanding principle of American law 'that 
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 
248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). Therefore, '"unless 
there is the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed' to give a statute 
extraterritorial effect, '[the Court] must presume it is primarily concerned with domestic 
conditions."' Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248 (2010) (quoting 
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 449 U.S. at 248). 
23. Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669. 
24. Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J. concurring). Similarly, in a separate concurrence, Judge 
Alito suggested that the decision "obviously leaves much unanswered, and perhaps there is 
wisdom in the Court's preference for this narrow approach." Id. at 1669-70. 
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on conduct that occurred outside of the U.S. 25 Yet where the plaintiff 
or defendant is a U.S. citizen or where the conduct that gave rise to the 
claim occurred within the U.S., Kiobel will not affect ATS's 
applicability. 26 Further, A TS will apply to a claim even when "all the 
relevant conduct took place outside the United States . . . [where] the 
claims touch and concern the territory of the United States with 
sufficient force to displace the presumption. "27 
A. Identifying Norms of Customary International Law 
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court established the 
standard used to identify a norm of customary international law, the 
violation of which gives rise to an actionable claim under the A TS. The 
standard requires "any claim based on the present-day law of nations to 
rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized 
world."28 Further, the norm must be "defined with a specificity 
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms [ the Supreme 
Court has] recognized."29 Elaborating on this latter requirement, claims 
cannot rely on "violations of any international law norm with less 
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the 
historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted [in 1789]."30 In 
considering whether a particular norm is sufficiently definite to give rise 
to a cause of action, a court determination "should ( and, indeed, 
inevitably must) involve an element of judgment about the practical 
consequences of making that cause available to litigants. " 31 
Despite the Supreme Court's enunciation of a standard by which to 
identify norms of customary international law, lower courts' 
interpretation of the standard lack uniformity. They have produced a 
number of discrete tests regarding the identification of international 
norms. The most frequently-utilized standard requires norms to be 
sufficiently specific, universal, and obligatory. Additionally, the 
Second Circuit requires that norms constitute "rules that States 
universally abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation and 
mutual concern. "32 
25. Matteo M. Winkler, What Remains of the Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel?, 39 N.C. 
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 171, 178 (2013). 
26. Id. at 186. 
27. Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669; see also Winkler, supra note 25, at 188. 
28. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 732. 
31. Id. at 732-33. 
32. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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The interpretation of the sufficiently specific, universal, and 
obligatory standard varies widely among circuits. For instance, the 
Seventh Circuit interprets the standard broadly, arguing that the 
standard "like so many statements of legal doctrine . . . is suggestive 
rather than precise; taken literally it could easily be refuted. No norms 
are truly 'universal'; 'universal' is inconsistent with 'accepted by the 
civilized world'; 'obligatory' is the conclusion not the premise; and 
some of the most widely accepted international norms are vague, such 
as 'genocide' and 'torture. "'33 Despite its broad interpretation, which 
on its face undercuts the standard's effectiveness in limiting the number 
of norms giving rise to actionable ATS claims, the Seventh Circuit 
purports to employ this standard. 
By contrast, at the extreme, some courts have incorporated a 
"lowest common denominator approach" into the specific, universal, 
and obligatory standard. 34 In Doe v. Nestle, the District Court applied 
the standard, suggesting, "where there are a variety of formulations [ for 
an international norm], the court should look to the formulation that is 
agreed upon by all-a lowest common denominator or common 'core 
definition' of the norm. "35 This is probably the highest standard applied 
in determining whether a norm under the law of nations exists36 and a 
misinterpretation of Sosa. 
B. Sources of International Law 
To determine whether a plaintiff properly alleged a violation of the 
law of nations, courts must review sources of international law. The 
United Nations enumerated the sources of international law in Article 
33. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber, Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011); see 
also Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc'y, 860 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 
1229 (W.D. Wash. 2012), for a different interpretation of this standard. 
34. See Doe v. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2010); see also In re S. 
African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Another reason for 
mentioning this standard is that Doe is one of the four cases reviewed about domestic 
courts' treatment of forced child labor claims under the ATS. Id. 
35. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1080; see also In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. 
Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). These cases both cite to Justice Katzmann's concurrence in 
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 264 (2d Cir. 2007), in which he 
interpreted Sosa to require a "discemable core definition that commands the same level of 
consensus as the 18th-century crimes identified by the Supreme Court." Interestingly, 
Justice Katzmann in applying this standard held that a norm of aiding and abetting liability 
under the law of nations exists. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 264 (J. Katzmann, concurring). In 
Doe, the majority came to the opposite conclusion by applying its lowest common 
denominator standard. 
36. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 264 (J. Katzmann, concurring); Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 
2d at 1080. 
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38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: (1) general and 
particular international conventions; (2) international custom; (3) 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and, as a 
subsidiary source, (4) the works of the most qualified publicists.37 
Domestic courts in the U.S. have made reference to Article 38 in 
determining the sources of international law to which they should 
refer. 38 They have also cited the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law § 102, 39 which defines customary international law as law 
"result[ing] from a general and consistent practice of states followed by 
them from a sense of legal obligation."40 
In The Paquete Habana, the Supreme Court enumerated the 
sources to which courts should refer to identify a norm under the law of 
nations: 
For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive 
or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the 
customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to 
the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research, 
and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with 
the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial 
tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the 
law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really 
· 41 lS. 
Specifically, the Court in The Paquete Habana, reviewed States' 
historical practice,42 States' contemporary practice, historical treaties, 
opinion of international tribunals, and the works of jurists regarding the 
wartime capture of unarmed fishing vessels from ancient to 
contemporary times. 43 
Although all international treaties provide some evidence of the 
custom and practice of nations, "a treaty will only constitute sufficient 
proof of a norm of customary international law if an overwhelming 
37. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1) 33 U.N.T.S. 
993. While the ICJ refers to customary international law as just one source of international 
law, readers of U.S. court opinions should be wary because some have used the term 
"customary international law" as a synonym for the "law of nations" in A TS cases. See, e.g. 
Filartiga, 630 F. 2d at 876. 
38. See, e.g., Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 399 (4th Cir. 2011); Kiobel, 621 F.3d 
at 132; see also Filartiga, 630 F. 2d at 876. 
39. See, e.g., Karadzic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995). 
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 102 (1987). 
41. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. 
42. See id. at 697 (considering evidence not only of affirmative State practice, but also 
the practice's historical condemnation). 
43. Id. at 686-700. 
8
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 2 [2014], Art. 7
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss2/7
2014] Establishing Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute 455 
majority of States have ratified the treaty, and those States uniformly 
and consistently act in accordance with its principles."44 The U.S.' 
failure to ratify conventions does not preclude their use as evidence of 
the law of nations. 45 Indeed, in certain circumstances conventions not 
ratified by the U.S. may not only be used as evidence of the law of 
nations, but also may be evidence of a norm binding upon the U.S.46 
Material sources of international law are afforded different weight 
depending upon the degree to which they evidence the existence of a 
consensus among States.47 Thus, a treaty may be afforded greater 
weight depending on the number of States that have ratified it. 48 
Further, certain weight is afforded to non-binding material sources of 
international law, such as unratified treaties or Declarations because, 
although they lack binding force, they evidence the existence of a 
consensus among States. 49 
The analysis to determine whether a custom exists under 
international law, as exemplified by The Paquete Habana, must be a 
fact-specific, as well as a historically and legally intensive, process. 
Despite the practical difficulties that such an application poses for 
courts, Filartiga and its successors continually re-engaged the federal 
courts in the task of recognizing norms of customary international law 
grounded in human rights law. 50 
III. DOMESTIC COURTS' APPLICATION OF THE SOSA 
STANDARD TO ATS LABOR CLAIMS 
This section will review the variety of treatments that domestic 
courts have afforded to plaintiffs who argue that defendants violated the 
law of nations by engaging in slavery, forced labor, and child labor. 
Courts seem more willing to identify a norm of customary international 
law prohibiting slavery or forced labor, than a norm prohibiting child 
labor generally. 51 Despite reluctance to identify a norm of international 
44. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 137. 
45. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 180 (2d Cir. 2009). 
46. See, e.g. id. at 180-81. In Abdullahi v. Pfizer, the court found that conducting 
medical experimentation on humans without their consent violated a norm of international 
law, despite the United States' failure to ratify a relevant convention. Id. 
47. JAMES CRAWFORD, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (8th ed. 2012). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Kathleen M. Kedian, Customary International Law and International Human 
Rights Litigation in United States Courts: Revitalizing the Legacy of the Paquete Habana, 
40 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1395, 1400 (1999). 
51. Compare Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1023 (7th Cir. 
2011) (refusing to recognize that a norm exists prohibiting the employing of children in 
9
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law with regard to all child labor, after applying the Sosa standard to 
child labor, two courts have indicated that under certain facts, especially 
where an employer subjected children to slavery or forced labor, 
plaintiffs' claims should be actionable under the ATS. 52 
Therefore, domestic courts seem receptive to recognizing a norm 
of international law prohibiting the enslavement and forced labor of 
children under the appropriate facts. Yet in practice, primarily because 
of procedural obstacles and secondarily due to the reluctance of courts 
to recognize norms of the law of nations, plaintiffs bringing A TS claims 
based on child labor have largely been unsuccessful. 53 
While this should not deter prospective plaintiffs, their arguments 
should be structured to demonstrate that their claims are based on 
conduct that rises to the level of either traditional notions of slavery or 
more modem conceptions of forced labor. Yet this does not mean that 
child laborers' causes of action based on slavery or forced labor should 
be treated as equal to those claims brought by their adult counterparts. 
Instead, courts must consider claims in conjunction with children's 
unique status within the international community, specifically as 
persons in need of protection. In particular, courts should pay special 
attention to how this status affects children's ability to consent and 
assert their rights within various forms and conditions of labor. 
This section first reviews domestic courts' treatment of A TS 
claims based on slavery and forced labor and continues by reviewing 
the treatment of child labor claims. It then argues that a norm of 
customary international law exists prohibiting child labor that is 
tantamount to slavery and forced labor, and that such conduct is 
therefore actionable under the ATS. 
A. Treatment of ATS Claims Based on Slavery and Forced Labor 
Domestic courts generally recognize that slavery violates the law 
of nations. Even in cases where slavery is not directly at issue, courts 
routinely refer to slavery as one of the few norms that clearly violates 
work that is harmful to their health, safety, or morals), and Doe Iv. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 
932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002) on reh 'gen bane sub nom. John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 
708 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that forced labor is so widely condemned that it has surpassed 
being merely a norm of customary law and has attained the status of ajus cogens violation); 
see also infra sections A and B. While Unocal's decision was vacated, it was only vacated 
after the plaintiffs and Unocal settled the case for an undisclosed amount. Ron A. Ghatan, 
Note: The Alien Tort Statute and Prudential Exhaustion, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1273, 1276 
(2011). 
52. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1075; Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023. 
53. See infra Treatment of ATS Claims Based on Child Labor, at section B. 
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customary international law. 54 Further, some courts have also 
recognized that forced labor may be actionable as a violation of 
customary international law under the ATS.55 
While ultimately rejecting a plaintiffs claim, in Velez v. Sanchez, 
the Second Circuit, noted that slavery "in which one human being 
purports to own another" violates the law of nations. 56 There, it asserted 
that of the norms of customary international law, the prohibition of 
slavery is "one of the most well-established."57 The Court opined that 
over time the norm prohibiting slavery has evolved to include a variety 
of its modem forms, including forced labor and servitude. 58 Other 
courts have similarly found that forced labor constitutes a violation of 
customary international law. 59 
In fact, in Unocal the Ninth Circuit went further and held both that 
slavery and forced labor were }us cogens violations.60 Additionally, 
while the Ninth Circuit strictly limits the norms of international law that 
may be asserted against private individuals, in Unocal it opined that 
"forced labor, like traditional variants of slave trading, is among the 
'handful of crimes ... to which the law of nations attributes individual 
liability,' such that state action is not required."61 
B. Treatment of ATS Claims Based on Child Labor 
This author found four cases in which plaintiffs alleged a violation 
of the law of nations based on the defendant's employment of 
children. 62 Of them, two were dismissed on procedural grounds. 63 In 
this section, an analysis of these cases is presented to demonstrate some 
of the procedural difficulties that A TS plaintiffs face, as well as to 
acquaint the reader with the wide variety of factual scenarios that have 
54. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F.Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (citing 
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
55. See, e.g., Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 946. 
56. Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 319 (2d Cir. 2012). 
57. Velez, 693 F .3d at 319 ( citing Yasmine Rassam, Contemporary Forms of Slavery 
and the Evolution of the Prohibition of Slavery and the Slave Trade Under Customary 
International Law, 39 VA. J. INT' LL. 303, 310 ( 1999) ). 
58. Velez, 693 F.3d at 319. 
59. See Adhikari, 697 F. Supp. 2d at 685; Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 584 F. Supp. 
2d 1355, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Unocal Corp., 963 F.Supp. at 891-92. 
60. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 946. 
61. Id. at 946. 
62. Specifically, these are: Mother Doe Iv. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1132-
34 (S.D. Fla. 2007); Ellul v. Congregation of Christian Bros., 2011 WL 1085325 (S.D.N.Y. 
201 l); Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023; Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1075. 
63. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1134; Ellul, 2011 WL 1085325. 
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given rise to A TS claims. In the remaining two cases, the court reached 
a substantive analysis of whether plaintiffs properly alleged a violation 
of the law of nations under Sosa. 64 
1. Child Labor Claims Dismissed on Procedural Grounds 
This section briefly recounts some of the procedural difficulties 
faced by plaintiffs who have sought to recover under the A TS based on 
a theory that child labor violates the law of nations. It suggests that 
meeting the Sosa standard is but one obstacle for plaintiffs bringing 
such claims. 
In Ellul v. Christian Brothers, plaintiffs brought a claim under the 
A TS in which they alleged a number of violations of customary 
international law, including the forced labor of children. 65 There 
claimants alleged that beginning in the 1940s and continuing for 
decades, a program created by the Australian government took children 
from the United Kingdom and Malta and moved them to orphanages 
and work camps in Australia. 66 Thereafter, the children "were treated 
shamelessly, abused, and neglected, subjected to forced labor, and 
denied education. "67 In 2011, three of the children, then adults, brought 
suit under the ATS. 68 
The Court dismissed their claims on a number of procedural 
grounds, including the tolling of the statute of limitations.69 Firstly, the 
Court dismissed the claim because it lacked jurisdiction over both 
defendants. 70 The plaintiffs' complaint named the wrong association of 
Christian Brothers and failed to complete service on the correct 
association.71 Further, the plaintiffs named the Christian Brothers of 
Rome, but failed to provide evidence that the Christian Brothers 
Oceania, against whom they alleged violations of customary 
international law, was acting under the control or authority of the 
Christian Brothers of Rome. 72 The plaintiffs also sued the Order of the 
Sisters of Mercy. 73 The court dismissed the allegations against this 
defendant because it found that "it is not an organization with a 
64. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023; Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 946. 
65. Ellul, 2011 WL 1085325 at *I. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Ellul, 2011 WL 1085325 at *1, 3-4. 
71. Id. at *2. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at *3. 
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structure and purpose to act as an entity ... [and] the common purpose 
to which Plaintiffs point-charity-is too vague to unify these regional 
organizations into a single legal entity."74 
The dismissal of these two defendants exemplifies one of the 
difficulties faced by A TS plaintiffs, namely a failure to obtain personal 
jurisdiction over defendants, a difficulty which presumably was the 
reason that suit was not brought directly against Christian Brothers 
Oceania. Further, in rare circumstances, plaintiffs may seek to recover 
from organizations such as the Order of the Sisters of Mercy that are not 
legally cognizable in the U.S. 
Secondly, the Court dismissed the claim for the expiration of the 
statute of limitations. The A TS has no express statute of limitations, but 
courts have borrowed a ten-year statute of limitations from the Torture 
Victim Protection Act. 75 Despite this, for certain claims, courts apply 
equitable tolling. 76 Yet, in Ellul, the court noted that equitable tolling 
"is appropriate only in rare and exceptional cases, in which a party is 
'prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising [its] rights. "'77 
Further, the court held that because plaintiffs were aware of the factual 
basis for their cause of action equitable tolling was inappropriate. 
In Doe v. Al Maktoum, the Court dismissed a claim brought against 
the Finance Minister of the United Arab Emirates and other unnamed 
defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. 78 There, plaintiffs alleged 
that defendants engaged in a number of violations of customary 
international law, including forced child labor.79 The plaintiffs, former 
child jockeys, alleged that defendants kidnapped, trafficked, and 
enslaved young boys from South Asia and Africa.8° Further, they 
alleged that at various times the children were "starved, deprived of 
sleep, injected with hormones to [halt] grow[th], and sexually abused" 
by the defendants. 81 
The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that it had 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant because plaintiffs relied on the 
affidavit of a researcher who relied on hearsay websites and newspaper 
stories about the defendant's ownership of personal property in the U.S., 
74. Id. 
75. Ellul, 2011 WL 1085325 at *3. 
76. See, e.g., Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 491 (6th Cir. 2009). 
77. Ellul, 2011 WL 1085325 at *3. 
78. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1134. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 1133. 
81. Id. at 1133-34. 
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his purchase of race horses in Kentucky, and infrequent visits. 82 The 
court held that his contacts were not sufficient under the Kentucky long-
arm statute because of an absence of substantial, continuous, and 
systematic contacts with the forum. 83 
2. Child Labor Claims Dismissed for Failure to Allege a 
Violation of the Law of Nations 
Two courts have analyzed the question of whether child labor 
constitutes a violation of the law of nations. 84 Yet in only one case, 
Flomo v. Firestone, has a court engaged in a detailed and substantive 
analysis of the question. This section explores those cases. 
In Doe v. Nestle, the Court opined that "it is clear that in some 
instances 'child labor' constitute[s] a violation of an international norm 
that is specific, universal, and well-defined."85 Yet it dismissed the 
claim on other grounds86 and exerted little effort to backup this claim. 
Citing to John Roe I v. Bridgestone, 87 the Court noted it would be 
difficult to distinguish between instances of child labor that violate 
customary international law and those that do not. 
In Flomo v. Firestone, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
addressed whether child labor constitutes a violation of customary 
international law and, affirming the District Court's holding, found that 
it did not. Flo mo, a procedurally complicated case, 88 exemplified not 
only the procedural difficulties facing A TS claimants, but also the 
difficulty of establishing a violation under Sosa. 89 
82. Id. at 1141-43. 
83. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1142. 
84. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023; Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1075. 
85. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1075. 
86. There, the court ultimately held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that an 
international norm existed for aiding and abetting liability. To establish their claim against 
Nestle, the plaintiffs relied on an aiding and abetting theory. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 
1057. Yet not all courts reject such claims. In Unocal, the Ninth Circuit held that A TS 
claims could rely on such a theory. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 947-53. In Nestle, plaintiffs 
alleged that the defendants knew or should have known of the child labor because of their 
first hand knowledge and by the "numerous, well-documented reports of child labor" by 
governmental and non-governmental actors. Their argument followed that despite their 
knowledge, defendants not only purchased the cocoa from the farms, but also provided the 
farms with resources "knowing that their assistance would necessarily facilitate child labor." 
FAC 152; Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1066, 1075. 
87. John Roe Iv. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1020 (S.D. Ind. 2007). 
88. See Jessica Bergman, The Alien Tort Statute and Flomo v. Firestone Natural 
Rubber Company: The Key to Change in Global Child Labor Practices?, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 455, 479 n.8 (2011). 
89. Id. 
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In Flomo, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated 
customary international law when they employed children in 
circumstances constituting "the worst forms of child labor. "90 By the 
time their claim was analyzed by the Circuit Court, the plaintiffs' 
allegations of slavery and forced labor had been dismissed. 91 The 
plaintiffs, who worked on rubber plantations in Liberia, alleged that the 
defendant economically coerced children into working full time by 
setting their fathers' daily quota of trees to tap so high that the fathers 
had to recruit their children to work with them in order to retain their 
jobs. Further, plaintiffs alleged that defendants imposed the quota 
knowing it could be met only "if children join[ ed] their fathers ... and 
work[ed] from dawn to dusk."92 
The complaint detailed the alleged work in which children 
engaged. These allegations included that plaintiffs began working at 
4:30 a.m. by cleaning 1,500 tapper cups; that they tapped trees with 
sharp tools facing the risk of blinding from raw latex; applied dangerous 
chemical fertilizers to the rubber trees; and carried two 7 5-pound 
buckets of latex at a time in order to be paid with their family's daily 
food allotment. 93 
It should be noted that, for the purposes of litigation under the 
A TS, the facts presented do not make this an ideal test case. First, 
Firestone did not directly employ the children. Instead, plaintiffs 
claimed Firestone coerced children into working and "actively 
encouraged [child labor]."94 Secondly, this is not a case of direct 
liability, but instead relies on a theory of agency liability. The fathers' 
direct employer, Firestone Liberia, was a subsidiary of the defendant in 
this case, Firestone National Rubber Company (FNRC). 95 After several 
challenges early in the litigation, plaintiffs limited their theory of 
90. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023. 
91. Id. 
92. Brief for Petitioner at 4, John Roe I, et al. v. Bridgestone Corp., 2005 CV05-
8168JFW, available at 
http://iradvocates.mayfirst.org/sites/default/files/11.17.05%20Complaint.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2014). 
93. Id. One of the organizations that brought the suit on behalf of the plaintiffs, 
International Rights Advocates, provides videos of the children and of the Firestone 
Plantation. StopFirestone, Firestone & Child Labor in Liberia, YouTUBE (May 29, 2008), 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FfzvdWqVIGk (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). 
For images, see Stop Firestone, INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS FORUM, available at 
http://www.laborrights.org/stop-child-labor/stop-firestone (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). 
94. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 92, at 4. 
95. Bergman, supra note 88. 
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liability to FNRC.96 
Despite these legal obstacles, the attorneys were probably 
influenced to bring the case by the great flurry of international attention 
directed at the situation of Liberian workers on rubber plantations in 
Liberia.97 Following months of national and international scrutiny 
directed toward the status of human rights on Liberian rubber 
plantations, the Human Rights and Protection Section of the United 
Nations Missions in Liberia (UNMIL) released a report detailing the 
situation.98 This report set rubber plantations as a priority for United 
Nations Missions in Liberia because "[i]n the context of Liberia's post-
conflict rehabilitation, the situation . . . [they] presented significant 
security, political, economic and human rights challenges for the 
Government which have not yet been resolved."99 Further, the report 
noted that "working conditions on the plantations violate fundamental 
human rights standards. The situation is particular [sic] poor in relation 
to child [sic]; child labor is indirectly encouraged by work practices and 
lack of access to education." 100 
In Flomo, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of 
defendant's motion for summary judgment, but the Court conducted its 
own Sosa analysis to determine that no norm of customary international 
law prohibited child labor. 101 Yet prior to announcing its holding, the 
Seventh Circuit expressed disquiet over the use of customary 
international law as a means to recover under the ATS. 102 
96. Id. 
97. See U.N. Mission in Liberia, HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIBERIA'S RUBBER PLANTATIONS: 
TAPPING INTO THE FUTURE (2006), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/473dade10.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) 
[hereinafter UNMIL]. Firestone's Liberian plantation is huge, and its website stated that it 
has more than 6,500 employees in Liberia. Resources, FAQs, FIRESTONE NATURAL RUBBER 
COMPANY, available at http://www.firestonenaturalrubber.com/faqs.htm#l (last visited Jan. 
28, 2014). 
98. UNMIL, supra note 97, at 5. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1016. 
102. Id. Its argument was as follows: Its reluctance originated from problems with 
notice and legitimacy. In particular, the court opined that notice was a problem because 
norms created by custom cannot be identified as clearly as those specifically identified by a 
legal text. Further, customary international law's legitimacy and, in democratic countries, 
democratic legitimacy, was a problem because through the use of custom, the international 
community imposes legal duties on the independent sovereign in the form of mandatory 
norms. The Court reasoned that while international law is ideally created by consensus, in 
practice it rarely is. Yet it seemed to suggest that some of its concerns were mitigated 
because Congress maintained the ability to limit the scope of the ATS, and therefore "the 
statute ... is not a blanket delegation of lawmaking to the democratically unaccountable 
16
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In applying Sosa, the Seventh Circuit examined the language of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 32(1); Minimum 
Age Convention; and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 
Article 3( d) individually to determine whether each gave rise to a norm 
of customary international law. The Court concluded that child labor, 
with regard to all of the Conventions, was too vague and encompassing 
a category to give rise to a norm of customary international law. 1 3 
Firstly, it rejected the argument that the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (1989), specifically Article 32 (1) gave rise to a 
norm of customary international law. 104 The Article provides that 
children have a right not to perform certain work, in particular that 
which is hazardous, interferes with education, or is harmful to the 
child's health. 105 The Court held that the language was too "vague and 
encompassing" to establish a norm of international law. 106 Secondly, 
the Court similarly rejected the Minimum Age Convention as a source 
of customary international law. 107 This Convention forbids children 
under fourteen from doing any work other than "light work." 108 The 
court opined that the Convention created no norm because of the 
vagueness of the term "light work." 109 Lastly, in evaluating the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour Convention, the Court noted that while it was 
"more promising" than the other Conventions, it found that Article 3( d) 
was "still pretty vague." 110 In particular, it enumerated three reasons for 
its vagueness, namely: (1) its failure to specify a threshold of actionable 
harm; (2) the "inherent vagueness of the words 'safety' and 'morals;"' 
and (3) its provision that the domestic law of nations determines which 
international community of custom creators." Id. Yet the Court noted concern that "[i]f [a 
democratic country] has consistently rejected the international custom, it is possible for the 
custom to apply to it." Id. Despite the court's concern, this last concern should be almost 
completely mitigated by the persistent objector rule, in which a country that consistently 
rejects an international norm will be considered a persistent objector, and therefore 
exempted from the rule. See Joel P. Trachtman, Persistent Objectors, Cooperation, and the 
Utility of Customary International Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 221 (2010). 
However, this is not the case for States that come into existence after the norm because the 
persistent objector rule will generally not apply to them. Id. 
103. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1022. 
104. Id. 
105. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 32(1), Nov. 20, 1989 
[hereinafter UNCRC]. 
106. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1022. 
107. Id. 
108. ILO Minimum Age Convention, art. 7, June 26, 1973. 
109. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1022. 
110. Id. 
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types of work fall into Article 3( d). 111 
The Court referred to the Convention's Recommendation 190 for 
more detail on Article 3( d), but ultimately dismissed its importance 
because a Recommendation "create[s] no enforceable obligation."112 
Here, the Court failed to consider whether the Recommendation, while 
not binding on States, could help the Court to discern whether a custom 
of international law exists, and if so, its scope. The Court also held that 
the plaintiffs failed to provide the Court with sufficient evidence of the 
practices and customs of nations as to demonstrate that States perceive 
that they have a legal obligation to follow the norm. 113 
After this discussion, the Court found that "[g]iven the diversity of 
economic conditions in the world, it's impossible to distill a crisp rule 
from the three conventions."114 Yet during this discussion, it was not 
clear whether the Court based this opinion on a cumulative 
consideration of all of the conventions, or whether it was based on its 
analysis of them individually. A proper evaluation of the plaintiffs' 
A TS claim would entail an explicit analysis of all of the sources taken 
together, which would ensure that the Court addressed whether the 
sources of international law give rise to a norm. 
The Court concluded by enumerating a number of deficiencies in 
the plaintiffs factual allegations. Specifically, the Court noted that it 
was unaware of how frequently employees employed children to help 
them fill their quotas; whether Firestone took effective measures to stop 
children from working; how many children worked on the plantation; 
the ages of those children who worked on the plantation other than 
those who brought suit; how much work the average child did; and the 
difficulty of the work. 115 
The application of the Sosa standard aside, the Court's concluding 
discussion was problematic. The Court noted that its "biggest 
objection" to the lawsuit was that it was unaware of "the situation of 
Liberian children who don't live on the Firestone plantation." It 
reasoned that the children who work on the Firestone plantation may be 
111. ILO, Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, art. 3(d), Nov. 19, 2000, ILO No. 
182 [hereinafter WFCLC]. 
112. Flomo , 643 F.3d at 1023. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 1024. It was not clear why the Court required some of this information as 
the Court did not fully explain its relevance. For instance, presumably had the Court found 
that the employment of the children violated international customary law, it would not 
matter how many children worked there. This is because the children who brought the 
claim should be entitled to recover for the torts committed against them in violation of the 
law of nations without reference to any other child employees of Firestone. 
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better off than other Liberian children because their fathers are well paid 
by Liberian standards. It continued by suggesting that they "would be 
worse off if their fathers, unable to fill their daily quotas, lost their jobs 
or had to pay adult helpers, thus reducing the family's income;" thus the 
Court did not "know the net effect on their welfare of working on the 
plantation." 
This argument is paternalistic; completely undermines the 
plaintiff's autonomy and freedom to decide what is or is not better for 
them; and is a social, not legal, argument. While the argument may not 
be wholly without merit, 116 any strain put on families is irrelevant in an 
analysis of whether child labor constitutes a norm of international 
law. 117 Further, if an employer violates customary international law, it 
is logically perverse for a court to justify that human rights violation by 
suggesting that the plaintiffs would be worse off if their human rights 
were upheld. The Court's role here was to determine whether a norm of 
customary international law existed, not whether enforcing such a norm 
would benefit the very plaintiffs who presumably, having consented to 
the suit, believed that suing the defendant was in their best interests. 
3. Concluding Note on Prior ATS Cases Asserting Child Labor 
Claims 
While no plaintiff has successfully pied a child labor A TS claim 
that has survived a motion for summary judgment, domestic courts 
seem receptive to recognizing a norm of international law prohibiting 
the forced labor and slavery of children under certain facts. In Nestle, 
while dismissing the claim on other grounds, the court noted that it was 
"clear that in some instances 'child labor' constitutes a violation of ... 
international law." 118 Further, in Flomo, while the court found no 
international norm proscribing "work which, by its nature or the 
circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, 
116. For instance, after plaintiffs served their complaint, Firestone adopted a "zero 
tolerance" policy with regard to child labor whereby it would fire any employee found to be 
employing the labor of a child. It is plausible that some workers or their families were 
negatively affected by this policy. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Company, 2010 WL 
4174583 (S.D. Ind. 2010). 
117. The best argument for its relevance is that courts have noted that when 
considering whether a norm of international law exists, the court must consider the practical 
consequences of identifying a norm. Yet the practical consequences factor is limited to a 
judgment about the "practical consequence of making that cause available to litigants in 
federal court," and not the practical consequences to present litigants. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 
732. 
118. Doe v. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1075. 
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safety or morals of children;" 119 it recognized that other forms of child 
labor might be actionable. Specifically, it opined that evidence "that 
[S]tates feel themselves under a legal obligation to impose liability on 
employers of child labor ... is readily available for the other types of 
child labor listed in ILO Convention 182, such as. . . forced child 
labor." Therefore, where plaintiffs overcome the procedural obstacles 
posed by A TS claims and furnish sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
that their employer engaged in slavery or forced labor, courts may be 
receptive to their claim. 
IV. A NORM OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
PROHIBITS SLAVERY AND FORCED LABOR SUCH 
THAT ATS CLAIMS BASED ON SLAVERY AND FORCED 
LABOR SHOULD BE ACTIONABLE UNDER THE ATS 
This section will argue that a norm of customary international law 
prohibiting both slavery and forced labor has evolved within the 
international community. 120 Taken together, the numerous treaties and 
the practices of States demonstrate that the prohibition of slavery and 
forced labor of children satisfy the A TS' s requisite elements, namely 
that a norm be specific, universal, obligatory, and of mutual concern. 
Further, this section will argue that children's status within 
international law differs from that of adults, and therefore plaintiffs' 
pleadings asserting A TS claims based on the forced labor of children 
should address their unique status. In particular, plaintiffs should note 
their conditions of labor. In doing so, they should direct special 
attention to children's potential lack of capacity to consent to both 
employment contracts and labor that will cause long-term mental or 
physical harm. Also, pleadings should address children's potential 
difficulty in asserting their own interests over that of an adult 
supervisor. Further, these factors should be included in a court's 
analysis of whether the conditions of the labor violated a norm 
prohibiting child labor that is tantamount to slavery or forced labor. 
119. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023. 
120. See Federico Lenzerini, Suppressing Slavery Under Customary Law, 10 ITALIAN 
Y.B. INT'L L. 146 (2000) (providing a comprehensive history of slavery in international law, 
as well as the contemporary state of customary international law regarding slavery, and 
argument for the recognition of a norm of customary international law prohibiting slavery 
and forced labor). Lenzerini argues that slavery has attained jus cogens status. Id. at 156. 
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A. Specificity: Defining Slavery and Forced Labor Under 
Customary International Law 
Slavery and forced labor are specific norms whose definition can 
be readily determined through reference to the relevant sources of 
international law. The international community defines slavery as "the 
status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership are exercised." 121 This definition 
originated in the 1926 Slavery Convention and has not been subject to 
great change. 122 The international community has reaffirmed this 
definition in a number of main instruments dealing with slavery. 123 
International sources, 124 as well as at least one domestic court in 
an A TS claim, 125 define forced labor as "all work or service which is 
exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which 
the said person has not offered himself voluntarily."126 While the treaty 
excepts certain forms of labor from the definition, 127 the exceptions are 
explicitly enumerated in the treaty and should not bar a court from 
finding the specificity element satisfied. 
In evaluating A TS claims, courts should treat forced labor as a 
form of slavery. 128 Courts should distinguish between and evaluate 
claims of traditional slavery and forced labor using these definitions. 
Yet while distinguishable, these definitions are related, and courts 
should recognize both as violations of customary international law. 
B. Universal and Obligatory: The Prohibition of the Slavery and 
Forced Labor of Children is a Norm Universally Practiced to 
which States Accede out of a Sense of Legal Obligation 
Identification of a norm of customary international law requires a 
finding that the norm is universally practiced and acceded to out of a 
sense of legal obligation. 129 One element looks objectively to States' 
121. Id. at 158-59. 
122. Id. at 159. 
123. Id. (citing to United Nations, Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of 
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery art. 7, April 30, 
1957, 226 U.N.T.S.3 [hereinafter Supplementary Convention]; Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court art. 7, Nov. 10, 1998, U.N. Doc. NConf./183/9 (1998)). 
124. See ILO, Forced Labour Convention, art. 2(1), June 10, 1930, ILO No. 29 
[hereinafter ILOFLC]. 
125. Velez, 693 F.3d at 320. 
126. See WFCLC, supra note 111. 
127. See id. art. 2(2)(a)-(e). 
128. See Lenzerini, supra note 120, at 165 (treating force labor as a modem variant of 
slavery). 
129. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 131 (quoting Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 
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practice, while the other evaluates States' subjective reasons for 
engaging in that practice. The latter element requires that States 
subjectively feel that they are legally obligated to practice the norm. 
Yet the objective and subjective elements may be interrelated. 
Specifically, a State may practice a norm as a result of a sense of legal 
obligation to abide by it, or in the alternative, a sense of legal obligation 
to engage in a practice may result from a State's preexisting practice 
thereof. Because of this interconnection, this section will consider the 
objective and subjective elements together. 
C. State Practice: Evidence of the Universal Adherence to the 
Proscription of Slavery and Forced Labor 
State practice demonstrates that States universally prohibit 
slavery. 130 The first national prohibition of slavery dates to 1794 in 
France. 131 Many States followed. By 1957, States had ratified at least 
300 international treaties suppressing slavery and the slave trade. 132 
Following World War II, global condemnation of slavery and forced 
labor continued and was expressed in the UN's human rights treaties 
entered into after the War. 133 Today States universally prohibit slavery, 
and slavery has been abolished in every nation of the world. 134 The 
long history of the global prohibition of slavery left a lasting legacy in 
the way that States and people understand slavery, "[R]eviving slavery 
has remained beyond the bounds of any contemporary movement's 
dreams or any [S]tate's ambition. Slavery rhetorically remains the evil 
of choice for any movement or government that seeks to mobilize 
sentiment against exploitative practices and coercive domination 
anywhere in the world." 135 
248 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
130. This section is meant to demonstrate that today slavery is universally prohibited. 
Therefore, the history provided is only meant to provide the reader with the most minimal 
reference as to the antislavery movement's timeline. 
131. Lenzerini, supra note 120, at 149. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 150. 
134. John D. Sutter, Slavery's Last Stronghold, CNN, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2012/03/world/mauritania.slaverys. last.strongho Id/index. ht 
ml (last visited Feb. 14, 2014) (noting that Mauritania was the last country to abolish 
slavery, doing so in 1981; yet the practice was not criminalized until 2007). 
135. SEYMOUR DRESCHER, ABOLITION: A HISTORY OF SLAVERY AND ANTISLAVERY 
461-62 (2009). 
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D. Treaties: Evidence that the Proscription of Slavery and Forced 
Labor is Universal and Obligatory 
The ratification of treaties serves as evidence of both objective 
State practice and the subjective State belief in the obligatory nature of 
a norm. Ratification serves as evidence of State practice in that States 
are required to comply with the treaty norm. Further, by ratifying a 
treaty States understand that they are legally bound by the treaty, which 
satisfies the subjective element. The main treaties regarding slavery, 
forced labor, and child labor have been ratified almost universally, 
suggesting that almost all States subjectively feel that they are binding. 
Further, their nearly universal ratification, in conjunction with the ILO's 
status treating them as "core" treaties, demonstrates the development of 
a norm of international law proscribing the slavery and forced labor of 
children. 
1. Treaties and Declarations Addressing Slavery and Forced 
Labor 
International treaties and declarations serve as evidence of the 
objective practice and subjective belief of States with regard to the 
prohibition of slavery and forced labor. In particular, the number of 
ratifications of the main treaties involving slavery and forced labor 
evidences States' universal subscription to the norm. Meanwhile, the 
number of ratifications as well as the international community's 
treatment of these treaties as "core" treaties evidence that States accede 
to the norm out of a sense of legal obligation. 
Sources of international law consistently demonstrate a universal 
proscription of slavery in its traditional form. 136 The Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights recognize an affirmative right that "[ n Jo one should be 
held in slavery." 137 The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
136. See Maria Fernanda Perez Solla, Slavery and Human Trafficking: International 
Law and the Role of the World Bank, 6 (Apr. 2009), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-
papers/Labor-Market-DP/0904.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2014) (citing United Nations, The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 4, Dec. 10, 1948 [hereinafter UDHR]; United 
Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 8.1, Mar. 23, 1976 
[hereinafter ICCPR]; European Court of Human Rights, The European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 4.1, Mar. 3, 1953 [hereinafter ECHR]; 
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 6.1, Nov. 22, 
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; United Nations, 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, art. 11.1, July 1, 2003 [hereinafter ICPRMW]). 
137. UDHR, supra note 136, at art. 4; ICCPR, supra note 136, at art. 8.1. 
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Rights 138 reiterates the right of individuals not to be held in slavery and 
asserts a prohibition of slavery "in all of [its] forms." 139 It also goes 
further and recognizes the right of individuals not to be subjected to 
forced or compulsory labor. 140 
Treaties proscribing forced labor have been widely ratified. Of the 
most important treaties on this subject, the Forced Labour Convention 
(1930), has been ratified by 177 States, 141 and the Abolition of Forced 
Labour Convention (1957) has been ratified by 174 States. 142 
The Forced Labour Convention defines forced or compulsory labor 
as, "all work or service which is exacted from any person under the 
menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered 
himself voluntarily."143 The Convention provides that ratifying States 
must "undertake[] to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in 
all its forms within the shortest possible period." Further, the 
Convention requires States to criminalize forced or compulsory labor 
for private actors. 144 
The Abolition of Forced Labor Convention provides that ratifying 
States "undertake[] to suppress and not to make use of any form of 
forced or compulsory labour" under a number of circumstances 
including when it is used for political coercion, education, economic 
development, and labour discipline. 145 Further, States are required to 
"take effective measures to secure the immediate and complete abolition 
138. The United States, as well as 166 other States, has ratified the Covenant. ICCPR: 
Chapter IV: Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS (Dec. 16, 1966), available at 
http://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=TREA TY &mtdsg_ no=IV 
4&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 29, 2014). 
139. ICCPR, supra note 136, at art. 8(1). 
140. Id. at art. 8(3)(a), (c)(i) (providing exceptions to the definition of compulsory 
labor). 
141. Only eight States have not ratified the Convention. See ILO, Forced Labour 
Convention, May 1, 1932, ILO No. 29, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11310:0::NO: 11310:Pl 13 lO_INS 
TRUMENT_ID:312174:NO (last visited Feb. 14, 2014). 
142. Only eleven States have not ratified this Convention. See ILO, Abolition of 
Forced Labour Convention, Jan. 17, 1959, ILO No. 105, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=IOOO: 1131 O:O::NO::Pl 1310_INSTRUMENT_ID:3 
12250 (last visited Feb. 14, 2014). 
143. WFCLC, supra note 111, at art. 2(2)(1). But see, WFCLC, supra note 111, at art. 
2(2)(a)-(e). (enumerating exceptions to the convention). 
144. See Report III (Part IB): General Survey Concerning the Forced Labor 
Convention, 1930 (No. 29), and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 
105), International Labour Conference 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/ groups/public/@ed _ norm/@relconf/ documents/meetingdocume 
nt/wcms_089199.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2014). 
145. Abolition of Forced Labour Convention art. 1, Jan. 17, 1959. 
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of forced or compulsory labour."146 
The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the 
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery explicitly 
deals with an expanded notion of the conducts that constitute slavery. 147 
The U.S., along with 122 other States, has ratified the Convention. 148 
While fewer States are party to the Convention, it is still widely 
supported and is useful as a vehicle to explore those practices that States 
consider similar to slavery. It includes, but is not limited to debt 
bondage, serfdom, and "any institution or practice whereby a ... young 
person under . . . 18 years, is delivered by either or both of his natural 
parents or by his guardian to another person ... with a view to the 
exploitation of the ... young person of his labor."149 
2. Treaties and Declarations Addressing Child Labor 
In recognition of the unique circumstances facing children, the ILO 
specifically addressed the slavery or forced labor of children in the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (1999). Since 1999, 174 
States have ratified the Convention. 150 The U.S. was one of the first to 
do so. 151 "[A]ll forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such 
as. . . forced or compulsory labour" are included within the 
Convention's definition of the worst forms of child labor. The worst 
forms of child labor also include "work which, by its nature or the 
circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, 
safety or morals of children." 152 
To demonstrate the emergence of a norm prohibiting child labor 
146. Id. art. 2. 
147. United Nations, Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the 
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, art. 7, April 30, 1957, 226 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. List of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions, ILO, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc91/pdf/rep-iii-2.pdf (last visited Feb. 
5, 2014 ). This includes some of the most populous countries that failed to ratify the Forced 
Labour Convention. Compare id. with /LO Countries that Have not Ratified this 
Convention, ILO, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=lOOO: 1131 O:O::NO::Pl 1310_INSTRUMENT_ID:3 
12174 (last visited Feb. 5, 2014). Specifically, the United States, China, Afghanistan, the 
Republic of Korea, and Brunei Darussalam. See id. The only States to neither ratify the 
Forced Labour Convention nor the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention are the 
Marshall Islands, Palau, and Tuvalu. See id. This suggests that only those latter States are 
not bound by the prohibition of child labor proscribed by each treaty individually. 
151. List of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions, supra note 150. 
152. WFCLC, supra note 111, at art. 3. 
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that is tantamount to slavery or forced labor, reference can be made to a 
number of other sources of international law. 153 While they have lesser 
force, because either they are not binding or because the U.S. has been a 
persistent objector, they should be consulted in conjunction with 
binding sources of international law to demonstrate the emergence of a 
norm of international law forbidding child labor that is tantamount to 
slavery or forced labor. 
These sources demonstrate a consistent concern about children's 
participation in the workforce. The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides that employment that is 
"harmful to [children's] morals or health or dangerous to their life or 
likely to hamper their normal development" should be criminalized. 154 
The Declaration of the Rights of the Child explicitly forbids not only 
child labor before "an appropriate minimum age," but also forbids 
"caus[ing] or permit[ing] [the child] to engage in any occupation or 
employment which would prejudice his health or education, or interfere 
with his physical, mental or moral development." 155 The Convention on 
the Rights of the Child also requires that States take affirmative 
measures to implement Article 32. 156 Specifically, it requires that they 
provide a minimum age of employment, regulate employees' hours and 
conditions of work, and establish sanctions for violations and 
effectively enforce the laws regarding child labor. 157 
In 1990, more world leaders gathered at the United Nations than 
ever before to attend the World Summit for Children. 158 There, they 
adopted a Declaration on the Survival, Protection and Development of 
Children, as well as a Plan of Action, detailing the implementation of 
the Declaration. 159 While the Declaration addressed a myriad of 
concerns, in part it committed to "work for special protection of the 
153. Solla, supra note 136, at 10 (citing ICCPR, supra note 136, at art. 8(3); ECHR, 
supra note 136, at art. 4(2); ACHR, supra note 136, at art. 6(2); ICPRMW, supra note 136, 
at art. 11 (2)). 
154. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res 2200 
(XXI), U.N. GOAR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200 (XXI), at 10 (Dec. 16, 1966). The 
United States is not a party. 
155. Declaration of the Rights of the Child [hereinafter DRC], G.A. Res 1386 (XIV), 
U.N. GOAR, 14th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/1386 (XIV), at 9 (Dec. 10, 1959). The United 
States is not a party. 
156. UNCRC, supra note 105, at art. 32. 
157. Id. 
158. A promise to children, UNICEF, available at http://www.unicef.org/wsc/ (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2013). 
159. Id. 
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working child and for the abolition of illegal child labor." 160 The Plan 
of Action reaffirmed a number of obligations of the CRC and suggested 
that all States should take steps to eliminate employment that is 
hazardous, interferes with education, or is harmful to the health and full 
development of children. Further, it suggested that States should seek 
to protect children engaging in "legitimate employment" by ensurinfi 
that they have the opportunity for a healthy and full development. 1 1 
The Plan of Action urged specific contributions from States at the 
national level as well as contributions from international development 
agencies, regional institutions, all relevant United Nations agencies, as 
well as others at the international level. 162 
E. JLO 's Designation of Slavery, Forced Labor, and Child Labor 
Conventions as "Core" Conventions 
While the universal practice of the prohibition of slavery and 
forced labor is evidence of State's perception that the norm is 
obligatory, its obligatory character is also evidenced by the importance 
afforded to the conventions by the ILO and its member States by the 
conventions' designation as "core" conventions. That designation 
suggests that the conventions have attained a status beyond merely 
binding upon the parties and explains in part why states accede to them 
out of a sense of legal obligation, namely because they protect 
fundamental human rights. 163 
The ILO regards the Forced Labour Convention, Abolition of 
Forced Labour Convention, Worst Forms of Child Labour, and the 
Minimum Age Conventions as 'core' conventions. 164 Core conventions 
160. World Declaration on the Survival, Protection and Development of Children, 
UNICEF 1 7 (Sept. 30, 1990), available at http://www.unicef.org/wsc/declare.htm (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2014). 
161. Plan of Action for Implementing the World Declaration on the Survival, 
Protection and Development of Children in the 1990s, UNICEF 1 23, available at 
http://www.unicef.org/wsc/plan.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2014) [hereinafter PAIWD]. 
162. Id. at 1134-35. 
163. In 2000, the ILO's Director-General, Mr. Juan Somavia, commenting on the ILO 
having reached 1,000 ratifications of its core Conventions, said, "[T]hese ratifications move 
the world's workers closer to the day when the principles of these core labour standards, 
which we consider as fundamental human rights, are enshrined both in international law and 
in the domestic labour codes of all ILO member States." Press Release, ILO, ILO 'Core' 
Conventions Ratifications Surge Past 1,000 Mark, ILO Press Release IL0/00/36 (Sept. 22, 
2000), available at http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/media-centre/press-
releases/WCMS _ 007909/lang-en/index.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2013 ). 
164. In fact, with only a total of eight Conventions designated as such, these 
Conventions represent half of the ILO' s core conventions. lnFocus Programme on 
Promoting the Declaration, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION'S FUNDAMENTAL 
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are those "fundamental to the rights of human beings at work. .. [ t ]hese 
rights are a precondition for all the others in that they provide a 
necessary framework from which to strive freely for the improvement 
of individual and collective conditions of work." 165 
Distinguishing these conventions from others, the ILO seeks to 
achieve global "basic human rights" and "decent work." 166 
Accomplishing this goal requires the abolition of both forced labor and 
child labor. Describing its inclusion of child labor within the core 
conventions, the ILO recognized that children not only possess the same 
human rights as their adult counterparts, but also a right to certain 
measures of protection because of their age, inability to assert their own 
interests, and lack of experience. 167 
F. Mutual Concern: The Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labor 
is a Norm of "Mutual Concern" among States 
Beyond proving that a norm is specific, universal, and obligatory, 
the Second Circuit also requires that States abide by the norm "out of a 
sense ... mutual concern." 68 The slavery and forced labor of children 
satisfies this element. Firstly, the international attention directed at 
slavery, forced labor, and child labor through treaties and declarations 
demonstrates that States are indeed mutually concerned about these 
forms of labor. In Filartiga, the Second Cirucit held that States' 
entrance into "express international accords" demonstrated that the 
matter was of mutual concern to States. 169 Secondly, within our global 
economy, labor frequently is a matter of mutual concern. While labor of 
a strictly domestic nature continues to exists, 170 a great deal of labor is 
international in nature, frequently dealing in products and services 
within the international stream of commerce. 
CONVENTIONS 8 (2002), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/- -
ed _ norm/- -declaration/documents/publication/wcms_ 095895.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 
2013). 
165. Id.at?. 
166. Press Release, supra note 163. 
167. WFCLC, supra note 111, at 43. "Children enjoy the same human rights accorded 
to all people. But, lacking the knowledge, experience or physical development of adults and 
the power to defend their own interests in an adult world, children also have distinct rights 
to protection by virtue of their age. One of these protections is from economic exploitation 
and from work that is dangerous to the health and morals of children or hampers the child's 
development." Id. 
168. Flores, 414 F.3d at 248. 
169. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888. 
170. Interestingly, some of the exceptions to the Minimum Age Convention, discussed 
below, are intranational, such as those who work in the home. 
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In fact, the factual allegations of each A TS child labor claim to 
date entails the mutual concern of States. In Ellul, plaintiffs alleged that 
defendants engaged in child trafficking and then, among other 
allegations, kept the children in circumstances constituting forced 
labor. 171 These activities are international in character because they 
involve the trafficking of children across nations' borders. Similarly, in 
Doe v. Al Maktoum, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants trafficked 
them to the United Arab Emirates as well as other Persian Gulf 
countries from Africa. 172 Further, they alleged that defendants enslaved 
them as child jockeys in Dubai and other areas, where forced labor was 
exacted from them. 173 This conduct was international in nature because 
defendants not only trafficked children to multiple countries, 174 but also 
compelled them to work against their will. 175 While no detailed facts 
are given about the camel races, it is not unlikely that they involved 
patrons from all over the world, especially when they took place in a 
city that attracts international business people and tourists, like Dubai, 
suggesting that the children provided a service to patrons from all over 
the world. 
Firestone and Nestle involved multi-national corporations who 
harvested and exported the ingredients for their products, rubber and 
chocolate respectively, from the plantations on which plaintiffs worked. 
Where multi-national corporations, which send their products to 
numerous countries around the world, violate international law, their 
conduct necessarily implicates the mutual concern of States. For 
instance, the cost of labor in one country affects the cost of products in 
another. In addition, the conduct of multi-national corporations may 
affect international relations between States. Relations may be strained 
if a corporation based out of one country does business in another, 
exacts forced labor from its residents, and passes on the benefit from 
such forced, and presumably cheaper, labor in the cost of its products 
abroad. 
171. Ellul, 2011 WL 1085325. 
172. Id. Further evidence of its connection the mutual concern that this case posed is 
that the defendants hold high political offices in the United Arab Emerates. Id. at 1133. 
One of the defendants was both the Vice President and Prime minister of the United Arab 
Emirates. Id. Another was its Finance Minister. Id. 
173. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1130, at 1133. 
174. An allegation that requires that defendant was involved in an international child 
trafficking ring. 
175. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1134. 
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G. Application of the Elements of Forced Labor to Children's 
Claims Warrants Special Consideration 
Forced labor claims176 merit special analysis in the context of 
claims by children in light of the principles codified in international 
agreements concerning child labor. Ensuring that employers do not 
violate children's fundamental human rights poses unique challenges 
which the U .N. has addressed in a number of treaties and covenants 
previously reviewed. In particular, these international agreements 
provide a framework within which to evaluate the last two of the three 
elements of forced labor, specifically labor "for which the said person 
has not offered himself voluntarily" and labor that "is exacted from any 
person under the menace of any penalty." 177 
1. Labor Not Offered Voluntarily and Children's Incapacity to 
Consent to Employment Contracts and Work that Causes Harm 
Whether workers enter labor agreements voluntarily merits special 
consideration within the context of the child laborer. Plaintiffs may 
contest children's capacity to consent to employment contracts, as well 
as their ability to consent to work that causes mental or physical 
harm. 178 International agreements recognize the right of children, as a 
class, to certain forms of protection in part because the scope of their 
ability to consent in certain situations is questionable. 
2. Lack of Capacity to Consent to Employment Contracts 
Minimum age laws are one way of determining the age at which 
States recognize the capacity of the child to enter employment contracts. 
To determine whether an international norm exists setting the 
permissible minimum age at which a child may consent to an 
employment contract, plaintiffs and courts should consult international 
treaties requiring the adoption of a minimum age for employment, in 
particular the Minimum Age Convention. 179 
Since its founding, the ILO sought to regulate the minimum age of 
employment. In fact, its agenda for its first General Assembly meeting 
176. As previously noted, forced labor is "(1) all work or service (2) which is exacted 
from any person under the menace of any penalty and (3) for which the said person has not 
offered himself voluntarily." ILOFLC, supra note 111, at art. 2(1). 
177. WFCLC, supra note 111, at art. 2( 1 ). 
178. This may occur either directly, through harm directly caused by the labor; or 
indirectly, through lost opportunities when the child forfeits other opportunities, in 
particular education, to participate in the labor force. 
179. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 108. 
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in 1919 included the topic. 180 In 1959, the Declaration of the Rights of 
the Child explicitly prohibited child labor before "an appropriate 
minimum age." The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights suggested States should adopt regulations setting a 
minimum age and violations of such laws should be punished. 181 The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child reaffirmed this concern and 
required that State parties adopt a minimum age of employment. 182 
In 1973, the ILO reviewed the issue of the minimum age of 
employment and expressed a renewed concern for it in the Minimum 
Age Convention. 183 Since then, of the 183 members of the ILO, 165 
have ratified the Convention. 184 The U.S. has not ratified the 
Convention; nevertheless, its minimum age laws are fairly consistent 
with the Convention. 185 
The Convention requires ratifying Members to establish national 
policies designed to eradicate child labor and over time to increase the 
minimum age of employment "to a level consistent with the fullest 
physical and mental development of young persons." The Convention 
forbids the minimum age set by the State to be either lower than the age 
of compl letion of compulsory education or lower than the age of 
fifteen. 1 6 Yet, in recognition of the child's economic role and lack of 
available schooling, it recognizes an exception whereby "a Member 
whose economy and educational facilities are insufficiently developed 
may, after consultation with the organizations of employers and workers 
concerned, where such exist, initially specify a minimum age of 14 
years." 187 
180. PHILIP E. VEERMAN, THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AND THE CHANGING IMAGE OF 
CHILDHOOD 311 (1992). It also included the topic of employment that threatened children's 
health. Id. 
181. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 154. 
182. UNCRC, supra note l 05. 
183. VEERMAN, supra note 180, at 314-15. 
184. Ratificaitons of C138- Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138), ILO, 
available at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=I000:11300:0::N0:11300:Pl 1300_INSTRUMENT 
_ID:312283 (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). 
185. Id. While the U.S. allows work at fourteen, which is inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Convention, for the purposes of this paper what is relevant is that the 
minimum age laws in the U.S. do not deviate from the laws set by other States by much. 
The Fair Labor Standards Act sets the minimum age of employment at fourteen years of age 
and limits the number of hours that children under sixteen may work. Youth & Labor, 
DEP'T OF LABOR, available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/youthlabor/agerequirements.htm 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2014). 
186. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 108, at art. 2(3). 
187. Id. art. 2(4). 
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The Convention also distinguishes between types of employment. 
For work "which by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried 
out is likely to jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young 
persons," the minimum age is set at eighteen. 188 However, where 
protections are in place for children under eighteen, children may be 
employed in such occupations at the age of sixteen. 189 
Certain types of work are excluded from the minimum age 
requirements set in place by the Convention. The Convention exempts 
work done by children "in schools for general, vocational or technical 
education" and work done by children who are at least fourteen "in 
undertakings, where such work ... is an integral part of' their education, 
a training program, or program designed to help the child choose their 
future occupation. 19° Further, members may choose to exclude limited 
categories of employment from their minimum age requirements. 
Despite this, the Convention forbids members from excluding work that 
jeopardizes children's health, safety, or morals. 191 
Child plaintiffs arguing that they did not enter into work 
voluntarily should refer to the Minimum Age Convention and the 
domestic laws of States to determine whether a norm of international 
law exists recognizing their lack of capacity to consent to their 
employment contracts. Because the Minimum Age Convention requires 
ratifying Members to enact minimum age laws, plaintiffs would 
strengthen their claims by demonstrating that States related to their 
claim ratified the treaty. In so doing, they would demonstrate the 
existence of a norm invalidating their consent to the employment 
contract. 
Specifically, reference to the Convention and to the domestic laws 
of States provides greater insight into a norm concerning the minimum 
age of labor. An ILO Report, Targeting the Intolerable, presented a 
survey on the minimum age laws of 155 of the ILO member States. 192 
It reported that while most States conformed to the minimum ages of 
188. Id. art. 3(1). 
189. Id. art.3(3). 
190. Id. art. 6. 
191. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 185, at art. 4(3). 
192. International Labour Conference, 1998, Report VI(l) Child Labour: Targeting the 
Intolerable, 86th Sess. at 24, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/ 1996/96809 344 engl. pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2014 ). 
Please note that it is not clear whether its review of the domestic legislation included only of 
members who have ratified the Convention or all members. Also, this source is dated, and 
therefore those making claims under the A TS may need to conduct an investigation to 
ensure its information is up to date. 
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labor imposed by the Minimum Age Convention, some fell below. 193 In 
particular, thirty States permit children under fourteen to work, and six 
of these States permit the employment of children as young as twelve. 194 
This suggests that a norm of customary international law may have 
arisen which would invalidate an employment contract between an 
employer and employee below the age of twelve, at least for certain 
types of labor. Because some States exclude certain sectors from their 
minimum age requirements all together, this is not the end of the 
inquiry. 195 
To identify a norm, plaintiffs must be attentive not only to the 
minimum ages set by the legislation of States, but also to the sector and 
circumstances of their work or employment. The Minimum Age 
Convention and many of its ratifying States distinguish between or 
exclude certain types of work or employment from their minimum age 
laws. 196 While this makes identifying a specific norm more difficult, 
diligent plaintiffs may be able to identify a norm. For instance, while 
States create exceptions for certain employment sectors, no state 
excludes "industry." 197 Therefore, a thorough analysis of minimum age 
laws and their exceptions suggests that at the very least a norm of 
international law has arisen prohibiting a child under twelve from 
consenting to an employment contract in the industry sector. 198 
3. Lack a/Capacity to Consent to Work That Causes Mental or 
Physical Harm 
Numerous international agreements recognize that children have a 
right to be protected from exploitation; a right that should make it 
impossible for child laborers to consent to exploitative work. Various 
treaties, including the ILO' s core conventions, emphasize children's 
rights to development and protection from exploitation and harm. 
Furthermore, the treaties not only require the recognition of this right, 
but also a related right, a right to their own development. These issues 
193. Id. 
194. Id. In fact only thirty-three States have set a basic minimum age for admission to 
any kind of employment or work, as required by the Convention. Id. 
195. Id. (reporting that the most common exclusions include family undertakings (60 
States); domestic service; employment in undertaking with a limited number of employees 
(frequently 10); apprentices; the self employed; and in most States where a competent 
authority exempts an employer (135 States)). 
196. Report VI(l) Child Labour: Targeting the Intolerable, supra note 192, at 24. 
197. Id. 
198. It is also possible that a more thorough analysis would actually put this age higher 
if the States that permit 12 year olds to consent to an employment contract require a higher 
minimum age for those children working in the industry sector. 
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are related because frequently exploitation necessarily occurs at the 
expense of development. Thus, within the discourse on the subject of 
child labor, critics often cite the interruption of the child's education 
and intellectual growth generally as short- and long-term 
consequences 199 of such practices. 
International agreements pay a great deal of attention to these 
concerns. The Geneva Declaration of the Rights of Children 
emphasizes that children must be protected from all exploitation and 
provided with the means for spiritual and physical development. 200 The 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child provides that "[t]he child shall 
enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities and 
facilities ... to enable him to develop physically, mentally, morally, 
spiritually and socially ... in conditions of freedom and dignity."201 The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights202 
( 1966) reiterates this concern for the exploitation of children: "Children 
and young persons should be protected from economic and social 
exploitation."203 The Convention on the Rights of the Child204 forbids: 
199. While the child and the child's family suffer the primary consequences, the State 
also suffers consequences from having its citizens' education and intellectual growth 
artificially stunted. 
200. Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child, Sept. 26, 1924. 
201. DRC, supra note 155, at art. 2. 
202. There are 160 States party to the Covenant. UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=TREA TY &mtdsg_ no=IV -
3&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). The United States is a signatory, but has 
not ratified it. Id. 
203. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 154, 
at art. 10. 
204. Ratified by 192 countries, more than any other convention. UNICEF, Convention 
on the Rights of the Child: Frequently Asked Questions, available at 
http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30229.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2014). It has been ratified 
by all states except for the United States and Somalia. Id. While the U.S. has not ratified it, 
at least one source reports that the Obama administration had, at least at one time, sought to 
reignite efforts to ratify the Convention. John Helprin, Obama Administration Seeks to Join 
U.N. Rights of the Child Convention, HUFFINGTON POST (June 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/23/obama-administration-seek n 2195 l l .html 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2014). More importantly, it is most likely that the U.S. 's refusal to 
ratify the convention is fueled by a fear that it will interfere with parental rights, and not its 
position on child labor. Lawrece J. Cohen & Anthony T. DeBenedet, M.D., Why is the U.S. 
Against Children's Rights?, TIME (Jan. 24, 2012), available at 
http://ideas.time.com/2012/01 /24/why-is-the-us-against-childrens-rights/ (last visited Feb. 5, 
2014). The Convention has gained such widespread recognition, that even non-state entities 
have adopted it, such as the Sudan People's Liberation Army. Id. Yet because the U.S. has 
refused to ratify it, the U.S. is characterized as a persistent objector to the treaty. Id. 
Therefore, while it should be used as supplementary evidence that a norm of international 
law has arisen regarding children and their right to be free of forced labor, a U.S. court is 
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(1) the economic exploitation of children; (2) children from performing 
work likely to interfere or be hazardous to their education; (3) and work 
that is likely to be "harmful to the child's health or physical, mental, 
spiritual moral or social development. "205 
The concerns enumerated in these Conventions should be 
considered when plaintiffs claim that they did not voluntarily enter into 
work. Children's ability to consent to work that harms them mentally or 
physically is far more limited than their ability to consent to work that is 
not harmful to their health. For evidence of this, plaintiffs should refer 
back to the Minimum Age Convention to determine whether there is a 
higher minimum age in place for the kind of work that they performed. 
Upon a thorough analysis of these sources of international law, 
plaintiffs may be able to identify norms of international law that limit a 
child's capacity to consent to employment where the work is mentally 
or physical harmful. While the specific articulation of such a norm is 
beyond the scope of this paper, plaintiffs should carefully analyze the 
conditions of their labor to determine whether the child possessed the 
capacity to consent to the specific labor in which they engaged. Absent 
consent, such labor can only be tantamount to forced labor. 
4. Labor Exacted Under the Threat of A Penalty and Children's 
Difficulty Asserting Their Own Interests 
The question of whether labor is exacted under the threat of a 
penalty necessitates special considerations within the context of child 
labor claims. Children, as a class and as individuals, may experience 
difficulty asserting their interests over that of authority figures, 
specifically adults. Without the ability to assert one's interest over that 
of an adult supervisor, the child may engage in labor under the menace 
of penalty in a wider variety of situations than would an adult. 
International agreements recognize this potential danger and affirm 
the child's right to protection from coercion and exploitation.206 While 
evaluating the factual context of forced labor claims by children under 
the ATS, federal courts should be mindful of these two affirmative 
human rights bestowed upon a child. They should recognize that 
employers acting contrary to these rights are in violation of the child's 
affirmative rights under international law. Courts will need to 
determine whether the employer exacted labor under the threat of a 
unlikely to give it much weight in its analysis of whether such a norm exists. 
205. UNCRC, supra note 105. 
206. See discussion supra Section IV(C)(a)(i)(2) (titled Lack of Capacity to Consent to 
Work That Causes Mental or Physical Harm). 
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penalty, but claims should be actionable when a court does indeed so 
determine, so long as the other elements of forced labor are satisfied. 
Lastly, the elements of forced labor may be intertwined such that it 
is unclear whether a child's labor was exacted under the menace of 
penalty or not offered voluntarily. Under certain circumstances, 
plaintiffs should dispute the validity of an employment contract on the 
basis of the child's lack of capacity to consent to the labor. Yet the 
definition of forced labor requires both that the labor is under the 
menace of a penalty and not entered into voluntarily, so plaintiffs 
should be sure to plead both elements clearly. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, child labor tantamount to slavery or forced labor 
violates international law, and therefore plaintiffs bringing claims 
alleging such conduct are entitled to recovery under the ATS. Because 
of the procedural and pleading obstacles, claimants will continue to 
have difficulty recovering under the ATS. Nevertheless, claimants are 
more likely to succeed if they carefully plead the elements of a forced 
labor claim, rather than if they rely strictly on the theory that child labor 
violates the law of nations. 
The elements of forced labor merit special analysis with respect to 
the child claimant. Where possible, pleadings should specifically 
address how the child's conditions of labor and lack of consent to labor 
violate international law. Yet courts must also be careful to consider the 
question of whether a norm of international law exists for a particular 
claim, taking into consideration all relevant sources of international law 
cited by the plaintiff. 
Whether the risk of liability from an A TS claim currently deters 
defendants from violating international law is a question outside of the 
scope of this paper. If the frequency of A TS claims increases, a 
deterrent effect may become noticeable. 207 Yet, this effect will be 
limited to those persons who foresee the possibility of a U.S. federal 
court maintaining personal jurisdiction over them. 
While courts continue to shape the contours and scope of A TS 
jurisprudence, 208 it remains a powerful strategy for human rights 
207. At least one author believes that potential defendants should be aware of the 
possibility of A TS liability. See Anna A. Komikova, International Child Labor Regulation 
101: What Corporations Need to Know About Treaties Pertaining to Working Youth , 34 
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 207, 208 (2008). 
208. For instance, just last year the Supreme Court held that where the conduct 
underlying an ATS claim occurred outside of the U.S., the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applies and claims must "touch and concern the territory of the United 
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activists to ensure compliance with international law, and therefore a 
possible remedy for at least some children who are victims of slavery or 
forced labor. 
States ... with sufficient force." Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669. Yet the parameters of Kiobel 
and what constitutes sufficient force is far from clear. 
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